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Under the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is required to designate 
critical habitat for listed species.  Designation could result in modification to or delay of 
residential development projects within habitat boundaries, generating concern over potential 
housing market impacts.  This paper draws upon a large dataset of municipal-level (FIPS) 
building permit issuances and critical habitat designations in California over a 13-year period to 
identify changes in the spatial and temporal pattern of development activity associated with 
critical habitat designation.  We find that the proposal of critical habitat results in a 20.5% 
decrease in the annual supply of housing permits in the short-run and a 32.6% decrease in the 
long-run.  Further, the percent of the FIPS area that is designated as critical habitat significantly 
affects the number of permits issued.  We also find that the impact varies across the two periods 
in which critical habitat is designated and by the number of years relative to when critical habitat 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  Under Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(the Service)  is required to designate areas viewed as essential to listed species conservation and 
requiring special management protections as “critical habitat.”  Designation identifies geographic 
units of habitat with distinct boundaries, within which certain public and private activities or 
projects may require review and/or modification as recommended by the Service.  As part of this 
process, the Service is required to conduct an economic analysis, and may exclude areas from 
designation if the costs of including the areas within critical habitat are believed to outweigh the 
benefits, provided the exclusion will not result in extinction of the species (16 U.S.C. 
§1533(b)(2)).     
  Critical habitat for nearly 500 species has been designated throughout the U.S.  Many of 
these designations have received a high degree of scrutiny and opposition, especially where 
habitat overlaps with resource-based industry or incompatible recreational uses.  Potential 
housing and development-related impacts have also received a great deal of attention in critical 
habitat economic analyses.  Designation may cause developers to alter project plans within 
habitat boundaries and/or delay construction activities pending Service consultation.  In some 
areas where population is growing rapidly, there is concern that designation may constrain 
housing supply and drive up prices, with corresponding negative impacts to local economies (e.g. 
Sunding et al., 2003).  However, little corroborating empirical evidence of such an effect exists.  
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the designation of critical habitat has had a 
depressive effect on development activity.  We carry out the test using a large panel dataset of 
counts of building permits issued in California municipalities (Federal Information Processing 
Standards or FIPS) for 1990-2002, which we adopt as a surrogate measure for the level of   2
construction activity.  By arraying these data spatially in a Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) model and combining them with information on a number of designations over time, we 
test whether designation in a given municipality results in reduced permitting relative to a no-
designation scenario.  
In Section 2, we provide additional background information on critical habitat 
designation.  In Section 3, we summarize the literature that is relevant to our analysis.  In Section 
4, we discuss our data sources.  Section 5 describes our analytical framework.  We develop two 
approaches to testing the hypothesis that critical habitat designation reduces development 
activity.  First we employ a matched pair analysis by comparing FIPS in which critical analysis 
was designated with the closest FIPS where critical habitat was not proposed.  Then we develop 
a model of building permit issuances based on the analysis in Mayer and Somerville (2000a, 
2000b).  In Section 6 we present the results of our empirical analysis.  The model that best 
controls for the endogeneity of critical habitat designation is a partial adjustment model that 
includes FIPS-specific fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable.  We find that the proposal 
of critical habitat results in a 20.5% decrease in the annual supply of housing permits in the 
short-run and a 32.6% decrease in the long-run.  Further, the percent of the FIPS area that is 
designated as critical habitat significantly affects the number of permits issued.  We also find that 
the impact varies across the two periods in which critical habitat is designated (1994-1995 versus 
2000-2001) and by the number of years relative to when critical habitat was first proposed.  
Finally, we present concluding remarks in Section 7. 
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2.  Critical Habitat Designation 
  The Endangered Species Act (the Act), enacted by Congress in 1973, is administered by 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) in conjunction with the National Marine 
Fisheries Service.  The Service's role is to identify species in danger of extinction and to advance 
methods for their conservation and protection, in the hopes of eventually removing endangered 
and threatened species from the Federal endangered species list.   
Listing species is the primary method by which the Act affords protection.  Section 9 of 
the Act, and the Service's regulations, prohibit any action that results in the "take" of a listed 
animal species; that is, actions involving harassing, killing, capturing or otherwise harming 
endangered and threatened species.  Furthermore, section 7 of the Act stipulates that Federal 
agencies must consult with the Service regarding any actions they fund, authorize, or carry out 
that may affect a listed species or designated critical habitat.   
Critical habitat is defined in section 3 of the Act as: (i) the specific areas within the 
geographic area occupied by a species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the Act, on 
which are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the 
species and (II) that may require special management considerations or protection and; (ii) 
specific areas outside the geographic area occupied by a species at the time it is listed, upon a 
determination that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species. (16 U.S.C. § 
1532(5)(A)).  
Under the Act, the purpose of critical habitat is to help protect those areas that are 
identified as being essential for the conservation of the species.  Critical habitat provides benefits 
to the species by informing the public and private sectors of areas that are important for species   4
recovery and where conservation actions would be most effective (in addition to regulatory 
protection under section 7, as mentioned above). 
The Act contains specific provisions that preclude economic and other non-biological 
criteria from being a factor in listing decisions.  Section 4(b)(1)(A) of the Act stipulates that 
listing determinations must be made solely on the basis of biological evidence.  Section 4(b)(2) 
of the Act, which calls for the establishment of critical habitat for all listed species if it is prudent 
and determinable, also requires critical habitat designations to be made on the basis of the best 
scientific data available (16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) 1994).   This section adds, however, in contrast to 
listing provisions, that the economic impact of the designation and any other relevant impacts 
should be taken into consideration before specifying any particular area as critical habitat.   As a 
consequence, areas where the costs of designation are believed to be greater than the benefits can 
be excluded from critical habitat designation. 
Our analysis focuses on California since so many recent listings have occurred there.  As 
of 2003 there were 82 listed species in California and 68 critical habitat designations (note that 
more than one species can be included in a single designation).  Figure 1 displays the geographic 
extent of these combined designations.  As shown, while a significant portion of critical habitat 
exists in less-populated areas in the southeast, there is a considerable amount of designated area 
in urban and suburban portions of the San Francisco Bay area, Los Angeles, and San Diego.  
Note that we use the terms “critical habitat proposal” and “critical habitat designation” 
interchangeably in this paper.  Technically, critical habitat is first proposed (at which point 
species information and maps get released to the public), and then following the economic 
analysis, public hearings and solicitation of comments, etc., is (possibly amended in some 
fashion and then) finalized.  So the proposal details where the critical habitat will be, but the   5
actual "designation" corresponds to the final unit boundaries.  From a practical standpoint, 
though, there is little difference between the concept of first proposal and final designation.  
Further, final designation usually occurs soon after proposal of critical habitat; in our data almost 
two-thirds of critical habitat actions were finalized in the same calendar year of critical habitat 
proposal. 
 
3.   Literature Review 
  Two literatures that are relevant to this analysis are the one on housing supply and the 
one on the impact of regulation on housing.  As noted by DiPasquale (1999), there has been 
relatively little analysis of the supply of housing relative to the demand for housing.  For our 
purposes, the key paper in this literature is Mayer and Somerville (2000a).  The authors develop 
a model of housing supply that is based on the Capozza-Helsley urban growth model.  While 
housing price is determined in the market so as to equilibrate supply and demand, it is the change 
in price that will affect the change in supply or housing starts.  Thus, Mayer and Somerville 
model housing starts as a function of the change in house price and housing construction costs.  
Since new housing development will not occur immediately, they include lags of house price and 
construction cost changes in their model. 
Mayer and Somerville compare their model to another important model in the literature; 
DiPasquale and Wheaton’s (1994) stock adjustment model.  In this model, housing starts are 
proportional to this period’s desired stock and last period’s existing stock (net of depreciation).  
The current house price is used as a proxy for desired stock and lagged stock is included as a 
regressor.  Mayer and Somerville note that the DiPasquale-Wheaton approach recognizes the   6
difference between housing supply as a stock and starts as a flow but the stock of housing is 
difficult to measure in non-census years since depreciation and removal are not observed. 
Mayer and Somerville use quarterly national data from 1975-1994 to estimate their 
model.  As they note, this requires two strong assumptions: 1) the model is applicable to national 
data, and 2) a single national housing market exists.  The resulting model includes three lags of 
the price change variable though only the first two are significant.  They estimate that the 
contemporaneous, one quarter, price elasticity of housing starts is 6.3% while the annual 
elasticity is 3.7%.  Finally, the coefficient on the change in construction costs is not significant.  
  In Mayer and Somerville (2000b), the authors use quarterly data for 44 MSAs between 
1985 and 1996 to estimate the model they developed in the previous paper.  The focus of this 
paper is on the impact of land use regulation on residential construction.  The main model is a 
regression of the natural log of permits on the growth rate of house prices and 5 lags of this 
growth rate, variables capturing land use regulation (months to receive subdivision approval, 
number of growth management techniques, and a dummy for the presence of development fees), 
the change in the real prime rate, and the log of MSA population in 1980.  First, Mayer and 
Somerville estimate a version of the model that corrects for first-order serial correlation and an 
MSA-specific error term.  The evidence indicates that regulation reduces housing permits.  
Increasing the number of months to receive subdivision approval by one standard deviation 
reduces the number of permits by 20-25% while adding a growth management technique reduces 
the number of permits by 7%.  The coefficient for the variable indicating development fees is not 
significant. 
   Mayer and Somerville then correct for the endogeneity of regulation using as 
instruments the number of jurisdictions with land use control, Reagan’s share of the MSAs 1984   7
U.S. presidential vote, an index of traffic congestion, MSA 1975 per capita income, the 
percentage of adult population with high school degrees, the 1980 population, and whether the 
state has citizen referendums.  The result is the expected increase in standard errors and a large 
increase in the estimated coefficient for one of the regulation variables.  They state that “We 
believe this effect to be too strong and suspect it is a result of our choice of instruments.”  
Nonetheless, these results indicate quite clearly that the negative effect of regulation on housing 
starts is not an artifact of endogeneity but a real impact on builder behavior.” Page 654.  It should 
be noted that Mayer and Somerville do not use a fixed effects estimator.  This is because the 
regulation variables do not change over time and hence would be excluded from the model if the 
fixed effects estimator was used. 
  Malpezzi (1996) analyzes the effects of regulation on housing prices.  Both supply and 
demand-side factors are considered.  The unit of analysis in this paper is the MSA.  Prices are 
taken from three sources: 1) the decennial censuses, 2) the National Association of Realtors, and 
3) hedonic house price indices (Thibodeau 1992).  Malpezzi includes as regulations information 
on rent control, land-use and zoning, and infrastructure regulations and building codes.  Results 
indicate that regulation raises housing rents and lowers homeownership rates.  On the supply 
side, the log of housing permits per capita was regressed on the regulatory variables (among 
others).  The results show that an increase in regulation reduced permits by 42%. 
  Quigley and Raphael (2004) note the high house prices in California and particularly the 
large increases in house prices between July 2000 and July 2003.  They also note that California 
has a high level of regulation that affects land use and residential construction because cities 
have relative autonomy in setting these regulations.  Quigley and Raphael consider three 
hypotheses that are consistent with the fact that this high level of regulation is causing the high   8
house prices in California: 1) housing is more expensive in more regulated cities, 2) growth in 
the city-level housing stock depends on the degree of regulation and, 3) the price elasticity of 
housing supply is lower in more regulated cities. 
  To test these hypotheses, Quigley and Raphael use data from the 1990 and 2000 Public 
Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) to generate house price indices for 407 cities in California for 
both owner-occupied and rental housing units.  Data on land use and residential construction 
regulations come from a study by Glickfeld and Levine (1992).  Quigley and Raphael generate a 
variable that is the number of 15 possible regulations that are in place in each city.  Annual 
building permits for each city are obtained from the California Industry Research Board (CIRB). 
  To test the first hypothesis that housing is more expensive in more regulated cities, 
Quigley and Raphael regress housing prices (1990, 2000, and change) on the growth control 
index (the number of controls) with and without county fixed effects.  The results with fixed 
effects show that an additional regulation results in a 1% increase in prices in 1990 and 2000 but 
has no effect on the change in prices between these years.  To test the second hypothesis that the 
growth in the city-level housing stock depends on the degree of regulation, Quigley and Raphael 
regress the growth rate in housing supply on the growth control index and the growth in house 
prices.  They instrument for the growth in house prices using estimated employment changes.  
The coefficient on the growth control index is negative and significant for single-family houses 
but not significant for multi-family houses.   
  To test the third hypothesis that the price elasticity of housing supply is lower in more 
regulated cities, Quigley and Raphael regress the growth rate in housing supply on the growth 
rate in prices.  They run separate regressions for less and more regulated cities where less is 
defined as zero or one regulation in place and more as 2 or more regulations.  Results show weak   9
evidence of a positive supply elasticity in unregulated cities and a negative supply elasticity in 
regulated cities. 
  Margolis, Osgood, and List (2005) look at whether critical habitat designation (CHD) 
leads to preemptive habitat destruction (PHD).  PHD often takes the form of premature land 
development or timber harvesting.  The authors point out that 90% of listed species are found on 
private land and most have more than 80% of their habitat on private land.  PHD is measured as 
the difference in the timing of permit applications between critical habitat (CH) and non-critical 
habitat land.  The species studied is the Pigmy-owl near Tuscon, Arizona.  In the case of the 
Pigmy-owl, designation was based only on biological criteria (even though CHD is supposed to 
take economic costs into consideration).  This means that the development potential of the land 
should be independent of CHD.  The authors assume independence conditional on such factors 
as distances to amenities and disamenities, soil types, and local housing values.  They use 
propensity score matching to pair CH land parcels with similar non-CH land parcels.   
  The data include approximately 25,000 land parcels from January 1997 through February 
2001.  The main estimation is a probit/logit model of pre-emption.  The dependent variable is 
permit application.  Dummy variables for CHD are broken down by time periods corresponding 
to events that affected PHD.  Generally, the results show that CH parcels were more likely to be 
developed.  Further, the results suggest that CH land parcels were developed roughly 300 days 
earlier than similar non-CH parcels 
  The authors also examine the impact of CHD on the sales price of undeveloped land.  
They collected sales prices for 7,000 transactions during the analysis period.  They find that the 
proposal of critical habitat (the release of the property map) results in a 20% reduction in price 
per acre (though the p-value is only 0.091).     10
Quigley and Swoboda (2004) apply the standard general equilibrium urban housing 
model (Brueckner 1987) to analyze the general equilibrium implications of CHD.  CHD is 
specified by designating land where housing production is not allowed.  The interesting case is 
where CHD occurs within the urban boundary.  They use simulation to solve their model and 
then compare the outcomes before and after CHD.  Results show that, given large enough set-
asides due to CHD (4% of land where development is prohibited), the most significant impact on 
the urban area is the rise in the price of non-CHD land.  A key assumption of the analysis is that 
the urban area is closed.  This means that the population is fixed and no one is allowed to move 
out of the area after CHD.  As Quigley and Swoboda point out, if this assumption is relaxed, then 
the cost of CHD is only the change in market value of the CHD land.   
 
 4.  Data Description  
The observation unit used in this study is a FIPS place.
1  FIPS boundaries follow either 
(1) the legal boundaries of incorporated areas (e.g., San Diego, Los Angeles, etc), or (2) Census 
Designated Place (CDP) boundaries established by the US Census (CDP boundaries are for 
unincorporated areas that support a sizable population).  There is a fair amount of variation in the 
size of FIPS.  The largest FIPS in this analysis is Los Angeles which is 303,000 acres with a 
population in 1990 of 3.5 million.  The smallest FIPS is Amador City (approximately 30 miles 
south-east of Sacramento) which is 209 acres with a population in 1990 of 196. 
The dataset includes the total number of permits granted each year for single-family 
detached and multi-family units (e.g., duplex, three/four, and five or more units) for 
                                                           
1  FIPS Codes are promulgated by the Federal government to facilitate data collection and processing and are 
established at a variety of geographic levels including, American Indian area, state, county, subcounty, metropolitan 
area, and place.  For further information see the FIPS homepage http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/index.htm   11
approximately 400 FIPS places over the period 1990-2002, as recorded by the CIRB.
2  This 
represents the incorporated subset (with minor exceptions) of all California FIPS places and 
encompasses the majority of all land within FIPS boundaries.  In this study, we focus on the 
number of single-family permits since they constitute the bulk of the permitting activity.   
A GIS model was developed to geocode permit data, compile critical habitat designations 
and other information and construct variables to support the analysis.  GIS data on FIPS places 
were obtained through the Census Bureau.
3  Figure 2 depicts the boundaries of FIPS included in 
this analysis.   
  GIS data were compiled from U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service offices for 39 critical 
habitat designations finalized in California between 1979 and 2003.  Habitat has been designated 
for only a subset of the total number of federally listed species found in California and GIS 
spatial data are only available for a subset of these species.  Table 1 provides an overview of the 
species-specific data relied upon in this analysis.  In some cases, the originally designated habitat 
has since been vacated by court order, but remains in effect until a new designation is proposed 
and finalized by the Service.  In these cases, we include the original designation in our analysis.  
In other cases, the vacated critical habitat is no longer valid and the revised GIS data are not 
available. 
  Three additional sources of data are utilized in our analysis.  Housing price data were 
acquired from DataQuick Information Systems.  These data provide information on the annual 
median selling price of single-family homes by city for the time period of our analysis.  We also 
incorporate information on annual precipitation patterns.  Data on total annual precipitation for 
over 200 monitoring stations throughout California were acquired from the Western Regional 
                                                           
2 We thank John Quigley for providing us with this data.  
3 http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cob/pl1990.html.     12
Climate Center.  Using GIS, these stations were mapped to the nearest FIPS place.  In many 
cases, a monitoring station existed within the boundaries of a given FIPS.  Data on acres of 
forest, shrubland, water, and wetlands were constructed from United States Geological Service 
National Land Cover Data (NLCD), which in turn are derived from 1992 Landsat Thematic 
Mapper satellite data.  The NLCD is a land cover classification scheme applied consistently 
across the United States.  Twenty-one classes are grouped into nine categories, of which we 
examine four:  Water, representing all areas of open water or permanent ice/snow cover (the 
latter being irrelevant to our analysis); Forested Upland, representing areas characterized by tree 
cover generally greater than six meters in height and where tree canopy accounts for 25-100 
percent of the cover; Shrubland, representing areas characterized by woody vegetation less than 
six meters tall as individuals or clumps; and Wetlands, representing areas where soil or substrate 
is periodically saturated with or covered with water.   
 
5.  Analytical Approach 
We employ two types of analyses to compare FIPS with and without critical habitat.  The 
first compares acre-standardized permit frequencies between FIPS where critical habitat was 
proposed (CHP FIPS) and the nearest FIPS without critical habitat (non-CHP FIPS).  The second 
is a series of regression models that draw upon the full panel dataset.  These analyses are 
described further in the sub-sections below. 
 
5.1  Neighbor Comparisons 
Initially, we make simple comparisons of the mean number of single family permits per 
acre issued annually for CHP FIPS and non-CHP FIPS.  Given that these two groups of cities   13
might differ in ways that influence the number of permits issued, for each CHP FIPS, we 
generate a matched pair to try to minimize these potential differences.  We choose the nearest 
non-CHP FIPS with the belief that the close proximity of the two FIPS will mean that they will 
be relatively similar in their development potential so that any difference in the number of 
permits issued (standardized by size of the FIPS) can be attributed to the designation of critical 
habitat.    
         To further isolate the impact of the proposed critical habitat designation, we consider two 
difference-in-difference estimators.  First, we look at the mean change in permits per acre issued 
between the year that critical habitat is first proposed and the year prior to this event.  That is, we 
compare the mean of st – st-1 for the CHP FIPS and the non-CHP FIPS (where st is the mean 
number of single family permits per acre in the year of critical habitat proposal (t)).  Second, we 
compare the mean change in permits per acre issued between the year after critical habitat is first 
proposed and the year prior to this event. That is, we compare the mean of st+1 – st-1 for the CHP 
FIPS and the non-CHP FIPS.  This difference-in-difference comparison controls for other factors 
that caused the number of permits per acre to change between years.   
  For each year, we present two basic results.  First we calculate the percent of times the 
number of permits per acre in the non-CHP FIPS exceeds that for the CHP FIPS.  Second, we 
test whether the mean difference is statistically significant by performing paired t-tests.  We then 
combine the years in a simple regression model to get an overall assessment of the difference in 
permits per acre across the two groups. 
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5.2  Regression Models 
Housing starts occur for two reasons, 1) to replace existing stock that is demolished and 
2) to meet increases in population growth (or, in general, increases in the demand for housing).  
Thus housing starts may occur to maintain an equilibrium stock of housing or they may arise in 
response to changing conditions that require an increase in the housing stock relative to last 
period.  Mayer and Somerville (2000a) point out that it is the change in population, i.e. growth 
that pushes up housing prices and changes in other factors such as construction costs that will 
result in a change in the housing stock.  Otherwise, the equilibrium housing stock will not 
change.  Thus, they include changes in prices and costs of construction as regressors in their 
model of housing starts.   
Our model is most similar to that in Mayer and Somerville (2000b) since they use MSA-
level data and include measures of regulation in their model of housing starts.  Our analysis 
differs from Mayer and Somerville (2000b) in at least three ways.  First, we use a fixed effects 
estimator to control for unobserved factors that affect housing starts and are correlated with 
CHD.  Second, we develop a partial adjustment model of housing starts.  This results in the 
addition of a lagged dependent variable to the model.  Third, we allow the impact of CHD to 
vary over time. 
Initially, we specify a model of housing starts where the natural log of the number of 
permits or starts (S) issued in FIPS place i during year t is modeled as: 
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where  it PRICE ln ∆  is the percent change in the median house price
4, CHPit is a binary variable 
that indicates whether or not critical habitat was proposed in FIPS place i in year t or in an earlier 
year, CH_AREAit is the percent of the FIPS area that was finalized as critical habitat (this 
variable is zero when  it CHP  is zero), and CH_EVERi indicates if critical habitat was ever 
proposed in FIPS i.  Further, Xit is a vector of other factors that affect the number of permits 
issued, YEARt is a vector of year-specific dummy variables, ui is a FIPS-specific effect,  ij ε  is an 
unobserved error term, and  6 0 ..., , β β are parameters to be estimated.  We denote this equation as 
Model 1.   
The year dummies will capture annual economic factors such as the interest rate.  They 
will also pick up construction costs given that they are relatively constant across the FIPS in 
California that are included in this analysis. The FIPS-specific effect will capture unobserved 
time-invariant factors that make the FIPS more likely to be developed.  These might include any 
time-invariant factors such as the distances to centers of economic activity and environmental 
amenities such as the Pacific Ocean or the existence of particular industries in the FIPS.  Xit 
includes the natural logs of population and land area of the FIPS (we do not include the number 
of housing units since the correlation with population is 0.98).  These two variables are based on 
the 1990 and 2000 censuses.  We set each equal to the value from the 1990 Census for years 
1990-1999 and we use the value from the 2000 census for years 2000-2002.  The FIPS land area 
actually varies across censuses because in 2000 the Census Bureau modified the spatial boundary 
definitions of many of the FIPS in our sample.  While, technically, the population in the FIPS is 
time varying, it only proxies for the true values in non-census years.  Thus, we do not include 
population as a regressor in the fixed effects model.  We do include the FIPS area variable since 
                                                           
4 While there is some concern that the median house price index is not adjusted for quality, Meese and Wallace 
(1997) find little difference between this index and the constant quality house price index.   16
the areas only changed in 2000 so our variable accurately measures the actual FIPS area across 
all years of the sample.  Plus, given that the number of building permits is clearly related to the 
size of the FIPS, we do not want any change in building permits due to the expansion or 
contraction of the FIPS in 2000 to be attributed to the proposal of critical habitat. 
We also include two indices that measure the regulatory stringency of the FIPS; 
regulations that affect the ability to build new units in the FIPS.  The first, GROW, is a pro-
growth index while the second, EXCLUDE, is an index of existing growth-limiting regulations.
5  
These variables are time-invariant since they are generated from data that was only collected for 
one year (1992).   Interestingly, these two variables are positively correlated.  Thus, it appears 
that FIPS are regulation “happy” or they are not. 
Of primary interest are the three variables that indicate critical habitat designation.  The 
binary variable CHPit measures the impact on the number of permits issued once critical habitat 
has been proposed.
6  Note that this variable remains equal to 1 for all years after critical habitat 
has been proposed.  Initially, we assume that the impact will be constant for all these years.  
Later on, we will allow the coefficient on CHPit to vary over time to determine if the impact 
differs after the initial year in which critical habitat is proposed.  Also, we allow for a non-zero 
impact prior to proposal to pick up possible preemptive activity (as discussed in Margolis et al 
2005).  Also, there are two distinct time periods when critical habitat was proposed: 1994-1995 
and 2000-2001.  We look at whether these were different in any way by comparing their 
observed characteristics and by allowing the impact of CHPit to differ across the two groups in 
Model 1. 
                                                           
5 These indices were originally developed by Glickfeld and Levine (1992) and were provided to us by John Quigley. 
6 We also look at the impact of final designation but generally final designation occurred at most two years after 
critical habitat was initially proposed and often occurred in the same year.  In practice, a variable that accounted for 
final designation was never significant when included in the regression with CHP (the correlation between the two 
measures is approximately 0.7).   17
Note that the coefficient for CHPit will measure the impact of the proposal of critical 
habitat regardless of the amount of land it covers.  A significantly negative value of the 
coefficient for CHPit will indicate that the proposal of critical habitat acts as a signal to 
developers of higher costs of development in general.  This can occur if the proposal of critical 
habitat leads to greater regulatory stringency in CHP FIPS for all development. 
To determine if the amount of critical habitat land affects the number of permits issued, 
we include the variable CH_AREAit which measures the percent of the FIPS area that is proposed 
for critical habitat.  We also include CH_EVERi in Model 1 to measure any difference in the 
mean number of permits issued between CHP FIPS and non-CHP FIPS conditional on all the 
other regressors including the other two critical habitat variables.  By including this variable, the 
coefficients on CHPit and CH_AREAit will more accurately measure the impact of proposing 
critical habitat and not any other underlying differences across the CHP FIPS and non-CHP 
FIPS.    
An important concern with CHPit and CH_AREAit is that because economic costs can 
play a role in critical habitat designation, they are not likely to be exogenous.  One might think 
that the critical habitat land will have less development potential, either because species tend to 
live in areas that are less likely to be developed or because there is a tendency not to designate 
areas that have high development potential as critical habitat.  The former reason could occur 
because the most developable land, all things equal, does not provide good habitat for species.  
On the other hand, areas that exhibit the greatest development potential are the ones where 
species are most likely to be affected since their habitat is being destroyed.  This is particularly 
true in California as new development is occurring in more remote areas with terrain more 
conducive to species habitat.   18
This discussion makes it clear that CHPit and CH_AREAit will likely be correlated with ui 
in equation (1).  One can view the addition of CH_EVERi as one way of controlling for 
underlying differences in the CHP FIPS and non-CHP FIPS.  This bias can also be removed by 
using an estimator that controls for ui.  One such estimator is the fixed effects estimator.  The use 
of fixed effects will not completely correct the endogeneity bias if the change in permits as well 
as the level of permits affects CHPit and CH_AREAit.  While this seems less likely, it is a source 
of bias that we must still address.  One way of correcting the bias caused by the endogeneity of 
CHPit and CH_AREAit is to use instrumental variables.  We use the annual rainfall and the 
number of acres of forest land, shrubland, water, and wetlands in each FIPS as an instrument.  
Thus we argue that rainfall and the number of acres of forest land, shrubland, water, and wetland 
are not correlated with building permits (conditional on the other regressors) but that these 
variables are correlated with the proposal of critical habitat.  Since we have more than one 
potential instrument, we can test for the validity of all but two of them using the over-
identification test (see Wooldridge 2003) 
DiPasquale and Wheaton’s (1994) stock-adjustment model for housing supply motivates 
a second model of permit issuance.  Given the prevalence of land-use regulations, it is likely that 
there is a lag in obtaining new building permits.  We use a partial adjustment approach to model 
permits in terms of the optimal level of permits,
*
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The result is a model with a lagged dependent variable.  Call this Model 2.   
  In both Mayer and Somerville papers (2000a, 2000b), the authors find evidence of first-
order serial correlation in a model similar to Model 1 above.  Their response is to correct for this 
using a Generalized Least Squares estimator.  In the context of Model 2, one can also interpret 
the presence of first-order serial correlation in Model 1 as evidence of misspecified dynamics; 
the lagged dependent variable is excluded.  Evidence in favor of Model 2 will be the presence of 
first order serial correlation in Model 1 and a significant estimate of α1 and the absence of first-
order serial correlation in Model 2.   
 
6.  Empirical Analysis  
  There are approximately 400 FIPS in the initial data set.  Due to missing information, the 
final data set consists of a total of 385 FIPS.  Definitions of the variables and their summary 
statistics are given in Table 2.  Of the 385 FIPS in the data set, 121 had critical habitat proposed 
within their boundaries while the remaining 264 did not.  Critical habitat was first proposed in   20
two distinct time periods.  In 1994 and 1995, critical habitat was proposed in 13 and 10 FIPS, 
respectively.  In 2000 and 2001, critical habitat was proposed in 63 and 35 FIPS, respectively.  
Thus, most (81%) of the critical habitat proposals occurred at the end of our data period.  One 
issue that we will investigate is whether there is any difference in these two groups of FIPS. 
  To get an idea if the FIPS where critical habitat was proposed (CHP FIPS) differ 
systematically from those where critical habitat was not proposed (non-CHP FIPS), we compare 
observable characteristics for these two groups.  Further, we disaggregate the information for the 
CHP FIPS based on the two periods in which designation occurred.  This information is given in 
Table 3.  We see that the CHP FIPS are larger in population, the number of housing units, and 
area but are actually smaller in terms of population per acre and the number of housing units per 
acre than the non-CHP FIPS.  The median price of single-family houses was higher in the CHP 
FIPS compared to the non-CHP FIPS during the 1990-1993 period.  The means of both the pro-
growth and growth-exclusion indices are higher in the CHP FIPS than in the non-CHP FIPS.  
Given the latter result, we don’t necessarily expect the number of permits per acre issued to 
differ across the CHP FIPS and non-CHP FIPS because of existing land-use regulations.  We see 
that, while the mean number of permits issued annually between 1990 and 1993 is higher in the 
CHP FIPS (because they are larger on average), the standardized (by acre) mean is actually 
higher in the non-CHP FIPS than in the CHP FIPS.  Thus, without controlling for this difference, 
we might attribute the proposal of critical habitat to be the cause of this lower level of 
standardized permit issuance in the CHP FIPS.  
  When we compare the CHP FIPS where critical habitat was first proposed in 1994-1995 
with those where critical habitat was first proposed in 2000-2001, the latter are smaller in 
population, number of housing units, and area.  Yet the 2000-2001 CHP FIPS had a higher   21
average number of single family permits issued during 1990-1993 and the average per acre was 
twice that of the 1994-1995 CHP FIPS.  Thus there does seem to be a difference between the 
CHP FIPS based on when critical habitat was proposed.  
 
6.1  Neighbor Comparisons 
We conduct this analysis using all CHP FIPS and starting in 1994 when the first critical 
area was proposed.  For the 120 CHP FIPS, the average distance to the nearest non-CHP FIPS 
neighbor is 1.3 miles.
7  The maximum distance is 11.5 miles.  In order to make it more likely that 
the neighbor is similar to the FIPS with proposed critical habitat, we also restrict the maximum 
distance to be less than or equal to one and two miles.  These restrictions reduced the number of 
FIPS with proposed critical habitat to 60 and 99, respectively.  We present the mean values for 
the observable characteristics for the matched pairs under the column labelled “Neighbor” in 
Table 3.  For the most part, these means are closer to the comparable values for the CHP FIPS 
than are the means for all non-CHP FIPS (column labelled “All”).  The final column in Table 3 
gives the p-values for the differences in the mean values for the CHP FIPS and their neighbors.  
While the standardized population and number of housing units and price are not significantly 
different at the 5% level, the mean standardized number of permits is significantly greater in the 
non-CHP FIPS.  This appears to be driven, in part, by some large outliers.  While the mean 
standardized number of permits in the non-CHP FIPS is 34% higher compared to the CHP FIPS, 
the median is on 16% higher.  Further, when we look at CHP FIPS where the neighbor is at most 
one mile away, the mean and median values are only 17% and 10% higher in the non-CHP FIPS. 
As discussed in Section 5.1, one comparison we make is the frequency with which 
permits per acre in CHP FIPS are less than in the neighboring non-CHP FIPS.  Consistently 
                                                           
7 One CHP FIPS was excluded from this analysis since its eight nearest neighbors were also CHP FIPS.   22
higher permits/acre in neighboring communities could suggest some effect associated with 
critical habitat.  As Table 4 demonstrates, no consistent pattern emerges.  The second 
comparison asks if the magnitude of differences in permits per acre is significant.  Here, the 
mean number of permits is greater in the CHP FIPS relative to the non-CHP FIPS for all but the 
last two years.  The p-values for the t-tests indicate that these differences are generally not 
significant though the p-values for the comparisons in 2001 and 2002 are 0.06 and 0.05, 
respectively.
8  When we restrict the maximum distance between FIPS to be two miles and one 
mile, the differences tend to increase.  This is particularly true when we restrict the distance to 
one mile.   
The difference in difference results are also given in Table 4.  These comparisons are 
restricted to the years when the critical habitat was first proposed.  Here we see that the change 
in permits in the CHP FIPS tended to be smaller than for the non-CHP FIPS.  These differences 
are not significant but the results are influenced by the small number of FIPS in each 
comparison.  These results do give some evidence that the proposal of critical habitat does 
adversely affect the issuance of building permits.  
  We then combine the annual comparisons in a simple regression model to get an overall 
assessment of the difference in permits across the two groups.  We regress the number of permits 
per acre on year dummies and CHPit.  The results are presented in Table 5.  When we use all 
observations, the estimated coefficient for CHPit is negative but insignificant (p-value is 0.077).  
When we confine the observations to only those years in which the critical habitat was first 
proposed, the coefficient is still negative but much larger in magnitude and the p-value is 0.025.  
                                                           
8 It is important to note that the number of FIPS places in California, as designated by the Census Bureau, increased 
in 2000.  Our current dataset contains permit data for a subset of all FIPS places present in 1990 and 2000.  The 
addition of new FIPS could be problematic if significant portions of critical habitat designated in recent years are 
contained in these areas and would otherwise appear in our comparisons (i.e., in incorporated areas).  A quick 
comparison, however, reveals that only 17 of all 231 newly established FIPS contain habitat for recent designations.  
Only 2 of those 17 are incorporated areas that would have otherwise been included in our comparisons.      23
An important result occurs when we divide the sample into the two periods when critical habitat 
was first proposed: 1994-1995 and 2000-2001.  The coefficient estimate for CHPit is positive but 
insignificant for the regression run using the 1994-1995 sub-sample and is negative and 
significant when the 2000-2001 sample is used.  Recall that the mean number of permits issued 
in 1990-1993 for the 2000-2001 CHP FIPS sub-sample was greater than the 1994-1995 CHP 
FIPS sub-sample, particularly on a per acre basis.  Thus it appears that the proposal of critical 
habitat might have more of an impact on the FIPS that are more active in terms of development. 
  Overall, these results suggest that the proposal of critical habitat had a negative impact on 
the issuance of single-family building permits.  Further, the impact is different depending on 
when critical habitat was proposed.  This motivates the more formal structural analysis through 
the modeling of housing permits. 
 
6.2  Regression Results 
In this sub-section, we estimate the series of models as described in Section 5.2.  The 
dependent variable is the natural log of single family building permits.
9  Regressors include the 
percent change in real median house prices, year dummies, variables that measure the potential 
impact of critical habitat designation, and other factors that might affect the number of permits 
issued.  When the price data are added to the data set, we lose 24 FIPS due to missing values or 
reliability issues.  Finally, the percent of the FIPS designated as critical habitat is missing for two 
FIPS.  The final tally for the regression analysis is 359 FIPS and a total of 4,132 observations. 
We first estimate Model 1 using FIPS-specific random effects.  This allows us to include 
time invariant variables in the model.  We include the natural logs of the population and area of 
                                                           
9 Given that there are some observations with 0 permits (3.44%), we add 1 to the number of permits before taking 
the natural log.   24
the FIPS in 1990, the two regulation measures, and the three critical habitat indicators; CHPit, 
CH_AREAit, and CH_EVERi.  The results are given in column 1 of Table 6.  Both the percent 
change in price and its lag are positive and significant (the coefficient estimates are 0.017 and 
0.014, respectively).  The contemporaneous price elasticity is 1.7 and the elasticity next period is 
1.4.  Thus a 1% increase in prices will lead to a 3.1% increase in permits over two years. Mayer 
and Somerville (2000b) estimate an annual supply elasticity of 3.7%.  The size of the FIPS and 
its population both significantly affect the number of building permits: a 1% increase in area 
(population) leads to a 0.669% (0.162%) increase in building permits issued.  The pro-growth 
index is positive and significant.  An additional pro-growth regulation raises the number of 
permits by 6.5%.  The estimated coefficient for the exclusionary growth index is actually 
positive but not significant.  
 The coefficient for CH_EVERi is positive but not significant.  The sign of this effect is 
surprising given that the mean of permits per acre prior to critical habitat designation was higher 
for non-CHP FIPS.  Once this land is designated as critical habitat, the number of permits issued 
falls by 23.5% and this is significant at the 1% level.
10  The percent of the FIPS area that is 
designated as critical habitat has a distribution that is skewed right; the mean is 15.4 while the 
median is 6.9 and approximately 10% of the values are greater than 50%.  We find that both 
CH_AREAit and its square are individually significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient estimate 
for the squared term is negative indicating that the number of permits decreases as the percent 
area that is designated as critical habitat increases.  But the impact of CH_AREAit is small as the 
number of permits decreases by only 1.7% if percent of the FIPS area that is designated as 
critical habitat is increased from 7% (median) to 50% (90
th percentile). 
                                                           
10 When the dependent variable Y is specified in logs, the appropriate interpretation of the coefficient for a dummy 
variable X is that  when X = 1, there is a 100*(exp(β)-1)% change in Y on average compared to when X = 0.    25
We next estimate Model 1 using fixed effects.  We test for first-order serial correlation 
and find significant evidence that it exists ( 37 . 0 ˆ = ρ , p-value<0.01).  We then estimate Model 2 
using fixed effects.  Note that Model 2 includes a lagged dependent variable.  The consistent 
estimator requires that Model 2 be first-differenced and that the differenced lagged dependent 
variable be instrumented.  We use the second lag of the log of permits as our instrument.  The 
results are given in column 2 of Table 6.  Note that there is no evidence of first-order serial 
correlation in Model 2 (the p-value is 0.713) and that the lagged dependent variable is significant 
at the 1% level with an estimated coefficient of 0.420.   
The coefficients for CHPit and CH_AREAit are both negative and individually 
insignificant at the 5% level but the p-value for the F-test that both coefficients are jointly zero is 
0.006.  The point estimate for the coefficient for CHPit implies that, all else equal, once critical 
habitat is proposed, the number of permits falls by 20.5% in the short-run and by 32.6% in the 
long-run.  Thus this provides evidence that the proposal of critical habitat has an economically 
large impact of the number of permits issued.  As opposed to Model 1, the percent of the FIPS 
area that is designated as critical habitat does have an economically significant impact of the 
number of permits issued.  For example, the number of permits decreases by 21.3% in the short-
run and 33.8% in the long-run if the percent of the FIPS area that is designated as critical habitat 
is increased from 7% to 50%.  It appears that CHD acts as a signal that development, in general, 
in that FIPS will be more costly and also further limits development as the percentage of the 
FIPS that is designated as critical habitat increases. 
The presence of the median house price in the model raises concerns about endogeneity. 
Endogeneity of the current price change variable is unlikely since the issuance of a permit will 
not result in an actual new house until some point in the future.  Mayer and Somerville (2000a)   26
point out that the actual agreement about the price of the house at the purchase and sale is made 
6-12 weeks prior to the listed date of the transaction and hence “The combination of a leading 
measure of supply and a lagged measure of prices makes endogeneity quite unlikely.” (page 654) 
Despite this conclusion, Mayer and Somerville take two approaches towards mitigating the 
possible endogeneity bias.  First, they leave out the current price change and second, they 
instrument for the current price change with the user cost of capital and the change in an index of 
employment in the MSA. They find that the instruments do not work well.  In both cases, there is 
little change in the estimated coefficients or their standard errors for the regulation variables.  We 
try leaving out the contemporaneous price change and instrumenting for the current price change 
with the lagged price change but neither have much impact on the estimated coefficient or its 
standard error for CHPit and CH_AREAit. 
While the use of fixed effects is likely to alleviate much of the endogeneity bias 
associated with CHPit and CH_AREAit there is still the possibility that  it CHP ∆ and 
it AREA CH _ ∆ are correlated with  it ε ∆ . We try two approaches to reducing this possible bias.  
Fist we include a random trend in permits that is specific to each FIPS.  If this trend is correlated 
with critical habitat designation and is left out of the model, the coefficients for CHPit and 
CH_AREAit will be biased in both the linear and first-differenced model.  Upon differencing, the 
random trend results in the addition of fixed effects to the difference model.  These fixed effects 
are not jointly significant and their inclusion has little impact on the estimated coefficient or its 
standard error for CHPit and CH_AREAit. 
Next we use the annual rainfall and land-type variables to instrument for CHPit and 
CH_AREAit.  Note that because Model 2 is estimated in first-differences, we are actually 
instrumenting for  it CHP ∆  and  it AREA CH _ ∆ .  We use annual rainfall, the first-difference of   27
annual rainfall and the logs of the four land-type variables as instruments.
11  The F-statistic/p-
value in the first stage regression for the test that the six instruments are jointly zero is 
2.72/0.012 and 1.18/0.315 for  it CHP ∆  and  it AREA CH _ ∆ , respectively.  Thus these six 
instruments are not particularly good instruments for  it AREA CH _ ∆ .  The results for the 
instrumental variables (IV) regression are given in column 3 of Table 6.  The coefficient estimate 
for CHPit has decreased in magnitude from -0.229 to -0.082 while the coefficient estimate for 
CH_AREAit has increased in magnitude from -0.006 to -0.016.  The two coefficients are no 
longer jointly significant.  Given that there is little change in the coefficient estimates for the 
other variables, it should not be surprising that the Hausman test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of the exogeneity of  it CHP ∆  and  it AREA CH _ ∆ .  Thus the results in column 3 tend 
to be more believable.  
Note that because we have six instruments, the IV regression is over-identified.  This 
means that we can test for the validity of four of the instruments.  We choose to assume that 
rainfall and the first difference in rainfall are exogenous.  This allows us to test for the validity of 
the four land-type variables.  First we run the IV regression using only rainfall and the first-
difference in rainfall as instruments.  We then regress the residuals from this regression on the 
exogenous variables from the IV regression and the four land-type variables.  The F-test that the 
coefficients for the four land-type variables are jointly zero is not rejected at the 5% level.  Thus 
this is evidence that the four land-type variables are exogenous. 
Next, we allow the coefficient for CHPit to vary both by the year since critical habitat was 
first proposed and by whether critical habitat was first proposed in the 1994-1995 period or the 
2000-2001 period.  We exclude CH_AREAit from this regression to minimize the number of 
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time-varying parameters in the regression so we can focus on whether the impact of CHD varies 
over time.  The variables are denoted as CHP9495-j, j=0,1,…,8 and CHP0001-k, k=0,1,2 to 
indicate which period and how many years ago critical habitat was proposed (CHP9495-0 refers 
to the 1994-1995 period and that critical habitat was proposed in that year).   Since the data go 
through 2002, there are eight years after critical habitat was proposed in 1994 but only two 
periods after it was proposed in 2000.  Further, to check to see if knowledge of the proposal of 
critical habitat existed prior to the proposal date, we include CHP9495-M1, CHP9495-M2, 
CHP0001-M1, and CHP0001-M2.  These variables are 1 in each of the two years prior to the 
proposal of critical habitat.  A negative coefficient estimate on these variables would be 
indicative of preemptive activity. 
As seen in column 4 of Table 6, the variation in the coefficient estimates indicates that 
there is a different impact during the period that critical habitat was proposed and in the ensuing 
years.  Note that the only one of these variables that is significant is CHP0001-0; the year of 
critical habitat proposal during the 2000-2001 period.  The insignificance of the other variables is 
due, at least in part, to the fact that there are so few observations when these variables are 1.  For 
example, there were only 23 FIPS in which critical habitat was proposed during the 1994-1995 
period.  When critical habitat was first proposed in either 2000 or 2001, there was a 28.6% 
decrease in the number of permits issued.  In the following two years, the decrease was 20.9% 
and 25.8%. Whereas, when critical habitat was first proposed in either 1994 or 1995, there was 
only a 15.2% decrease in the number of permits issued.  What is somewhat surprising is that this 
impact increased to 42.5% and 36.7% in the two years after critical habitat was proposed.  After 
that, the impact was similar to the year that critical habitat was first proposed.  Finally note that 
there is no impact on permit issuances in the two years prior to critical habitat proposal.  This last   29
result is not entirely surprising considering the circumstances of most California designations.  
Species in question typically occupy the proposed habitat and developers and others may already 
be aware of their presence due to protections afforded under other provisions of the Act.   The 
proposal itself, however, through the delineation of specific boundaries and interpretation of that 
information by developers and municipalities is a significant event.  Finally, these results suggest 
that we are controlling for the endogeneity of this event (mostly through the use of fixed effects). 
 
7.  Conclusion 
We have conducted one of the first empirical analyses of the impact of critical habitat 
designation on the issuance of building permits for single family homes.  Our data consist of the 
number of single family permits issued in close to 400 cities (FIPS) in California for the period 
1990-2002.  In our final dataset, critical habitat was proposed in 23 cities during the 1994-1995 
period and in 98 cities during the 2000-2001 period.  Since the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is 
required to consider economic impacts when designating critical habitat there is likely to be an 
endogeneity problem. First, we paired each FIPS in which critical habitat had been proposed 
with the closest FIPS where critical habitat had not been proposed.  We find some evidence that 
supports the negative impact of critical habitat designation on the supply of housing permits in 
FIPS where designation took place in the 2000-2001 period but not in the 1994-1995 period.  We 
plan to investigate further the reasons why this difference exists.  Possible explanations will 
focus on differences in the characteristics of the FIPS, both physical and spatial, and the 
economic conditions in these two periods that might have differentially affected the housing 
market.   30
 We then develop a theoretical model of permit supply based on the model of Mayer and 
Somerville (2000a, 2000b).  Our best model in terms of controlling for the endogeneity of 
critical habitat designation is a partial adjustment model that includes FIPS-specific fixed effects 
and a lagged dependent variable.  Here, we find that the proposal of critical habitat results in a 
20.5% decrease in the supply of housing permits in the short-run and a 32.6% decrease in the 
long-run.  It appears that CHD acts as a signal that development, in general, in that FIPS will be 
more costly.  This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that cities where critical habitat has been 
designated tend to become more risk averse and hence more stringent in issuing new building 
permits regardless of whether or not they are for land in critical habitat designated areas.   
Further, the percent of the FIPS area that is designated as critical habitat does have an 
economically significant impact of the number of permits issued.  For example, the number of 
permits decreases by 21.3% in the short-run and 33.8% in the long-run if the percent of the FIPS 
area that is designated as critical habitat is increased from 7% (median) to 50% (90
th percentile).   
We also find that the impact varies across the two periods in which critical habitat is 
designated and by the number of years relative to when critical habitat was first proposed. We do 
not find evidence that preemptive behavior since there is no significant change in the number of 
building permits in the two years prior to critical habitat proposal.  Since critical habitat is a 
relatively new phenomenon, this analysis can only be enhanced by more data in the future.    
This is the first step towards determining the impact of critical habitat designation on the 
housing market in California.  The next step is to look at the general equilibrium impact of CHD 
on the issuance of building permits.  This will capture any substitution of the lost development in 
CHP FIPS with additional new development in the non-CHP FIPS.  The final step is to translate 
the change in the supply of new building permits into an impact on the overall price of housing   31
in order to determine the full costs of critical habitat designation.  We leave these two steps for 
future research. 
   32
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Figure 1.  Approximate Extent of Designated Critical Habitat in California   34
Figure 2.  FIPS Places included in Empirical Analysis 
 




Federally Listed Species and Critical Habitat 





Total number of species  82 
Total number of critical habitat 
designations 
68 
Number of species for which GIS data 
are available for designations 
 
39 
Number of species habitat designations 
that intersect with FIPS places 
 
26 
Source: USFWS Website (endangered.fws.gov) 
Note: the number of critical habitat designations is not 
equivalent to the number of listed species.  For example, 
several species can be included in one designation or 
individual species can be found in separate designations 
that occupy the same land. 
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Table 2 - Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
                    
Variable   Definition  N Obs  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum Maximum
PERMITS (S)   Single family permits  4811 152.33  302.11  0  3227 
CHP 
 1 if critical habitat proposed in 
current or prior year, 0 otherwise  4811 0.09  0.29  0  1 
CH_EVER 
 1 if critical habitat ever proposed, 0 
otherwise  4811 0.32  0.47  0  1 
CH_AREA 
 Percent FIPS area designated as 
critical habitat when CHP=1, 0 
otherwise  4785 1.62  8.72  0.00  91.49 
PRICE 
 Median house price in 1,000s of 
1990 dollars   4687  171.19    121.55     24.19    2520.69 
AREA 
 Land area of FIPS in 1990 in 
1,000s of acres  4811 10.22  22.03  0.21  303.34 
POPULATION   Population in 1990 in 1,000s  4811 56.97  198.72  0.19 3485.40 
HOUSE UNITS 
 Number of housing units in 1990 in 
1,000s   4811 21.25  74.14  0.09 1299.96 
GROW   Pro growth index  4811 2.49  2.30  0  9 
EXCLUDE   Exclusionary growth index  4811 8.15  6.48  0  58 
RAINFALL  Annual precipitation in inches  4811 18.42  12.58  0.00  102.49 
FOREST 
Acres characterized by tree cover 
generally greater than 6 meters in 
height  4811 380.07  1411.10  0.00 19673.23
SHRUBLAND 
Acres of areas characterized by 
woody vegetation less than six 
meters tall  4811 1841.95  6328.05  0.00  76468.08
WATER  Acres of areas of open water  4811 82.46  525.41  0.00 8407.19 
WETLAND 
Acres of areas where soil or 
substrate is periodically saturated 
with or covered with water  4811 8.99  42.26  0.00 404.24   38
 
Table 3 - Comparison of CHP FIPS and Non-CHP FIPS 
   





2001  p-value All Neighbor  p-value 
POPULATION (in 1990)  103.348 112.69 63.542 0.531 32.804  35.340  0.030 
HOUSE UNITS (in 1990)  38.896  42.508 23.507 0.516 12.097  13.166  0.028 
AREA (in 1990)  17.598  18.937  11.889  0.389  6.397  7.057  0.002 
POPULATION/AREA (in 1990)  5.292 5.340 5.086 0.735 6.207  6.601  0.050 
HOUSE UNITS/AREA (in 1990)  2.018 2.057 1.849 0.470 2.258  2.371  0.112 
PRICE, 1990-1993  190.255 158.845 199.015 0.000 170.809 177.157  0.067 
PERMITS, 1990-1993  188.94  178.45  233.32 0.095 97.942 126.245  0.000 
PERMITS/AREA, 1990-1993  0.013  0.011 0.022 0.000 0.018  0.018  0.003 
GROWTH 2.736  2.847  2.261  0.259  2.261  2.067  0.014 
EXCLUDE 9.579  9.724  8.957 0.646 7.170  7.463  0.009 
   39
 
Table 4: Matched Pair Results 
  
Year  Number  P Neighs >  pct Diff  P-value
1994 13 46.15  32.89 0.38
1995 23 47.83  34.70 0.28
1996 23 43.48  10.11 0.82
1997 23 39.13  31.78 0.41
1998 23 34.78  42.01 0.32
1999 23 34.78  38.78 0.40
2000 86 44.71  10.46 0.58
2001 121  51.69  -45.35 0.06
2002 120  51.69  -43.70 0.05
Distance between pairs less than or equal to 2 
1994 11 36.36  37.42 0.35
1995 20 45.00  46.62 0.14
1996 20 45.00 5.85 0.90
1997 20 35.00  43.98 0.26
1998 20 35.00  61.52 0.14
1999 20 35.00  60.76 0.18
2000 72 41.67  11.15 0.61
2001 99 48.98  -34.44 0.16
2002 98 50.00  -39.73 0.11
Distance between pairs less than or equal to 1 
1994 8  25.00  67.98 0.10
1995 15 40.00  68.12 0.04
1996 15 26.67  70.41 0.06
1997 15 26.67  60.58 0.12
1998 15 26.67  76.85 0.09
1999 15 33.33  75.29 0.13
2000 48 39.58  19.11 0.49
2001 58 48.28  -58.46 0.13
2002 58 48.28  -51.16 0.16
sf - sf(-1) 
1994 12 76.92  -136.01 0.10
1995 10 70.00  -2032.21 0.41
2000 63 54.84  -39.18 0.64
2001 35 71.43  -76.90 0.59
sf(+1)-sf(-1) 
1994 12 69.23  -86.02 0.14
1995 10 40.00  -120.75 0.31
2000 63 53.23  -212.14 0.16
2001 35 51.43  60.47 0.90
   40
 
Table 5 – Matched Pair Regression Results 
 
 coef  se  p-value  num  R-sq 
All Observations  -0.002 0.002 0.077  898.000  0.014 
Distance <= 1 Mile  0.002  0.002  0.419  494.000  0.014 
Only Year Proposed  -0.005 0.003 0.025  240.000  0.025 
Only Year Proposed and Distance <= 1 
Mile -0.003  0.004  0.121  130.000  0.029 
1994-5  0.008 0.002 0.500  394.000  0.052 
2000-1 -0.009  0.003  0.000  504.000  0.026 
1994-5:Distance <= 1 Mile  0.015  0.003  0.500  248.000  0.113 
2000-1:Distance <= 1 Mile  -0.011  0.003  0.000  246.000  0.040 
1994-5:Only  Year  Proposed  0.005 0.005 0.414  46.000  0.119 
2000-1:Only Year Proposed  -0.008  0.004  0.009  194.000  0.022 
1994-5:Only Year Proposed and Distance 
<= 1Mile  0.014 0.006 0.497  32.000  0.276 
200-1:Only Year Proposed and Distance 
<= 1 Mile  -0.008  0.004  0.018  98.000  0.033 
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Table 6 - Regression Results 
  
Variable 
Model 1 – RE 
(1) 
Model 2 – FE 
(2) 
Model 2 – IV 
(3) 
Model 2 – FE 
(4) 
lnS-1      0.420** 0.421** 0.422** 
      (0.076)  (0.096)  (0.077) 
∆lnPRICE 0.017**  0.004*  0.004  0.004* 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆lnPRICE-1 0.014**  -0.0005  -0.0006  0.000 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
lnAREA  0.669**  0.319 0.291 0.327 
    (0.064) (0.189) (0.399) (0.190) 
lnPOPULATION  0.162*          
   (0.064)          
GROW  0.065*          
   (0.028)          
EXCLUDE  0.012          
   (0.010)          
CH_EVER  0.150          
   (0.131)          
CHP -0.268**  -0.229  -0.082     
    (0.084) (0.129) (1.873)     
CH_AREA  0.016*  -0.006   -0.017    
   (0.007)  (0.005)   (0.120)    
CH_AREA
2/100  -0.020*     
    (0.009)     
CHP9495-M2           0.05 
            (0.229) 
CHP9495-M1           0.004 
            (0.228) 
CHP9495-0           -0.165 
            (0.227) 
CHP9495-1           -0.553 
            (0.324) 
CHP9495-2           -0.458 
            (0.400) 
CHP9495-3           -0.192 
            (0.462) 
CHP9495-4           -0.166 
            (0.515) 
CHP9495-5           -0.108 
            (0.565) 
CHP9495-6           0.07 
            (0.610) 
CHP9495-7           -0.293 
            (0.653)  
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